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1. Introduction  
In this paper, we estimate the Knowledge Capital Model (KC-model) of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), described in Markusen (2002). The model is a synthesis of models of 
horizontal FDI, where FDI is driven by the access to host-country markets, and models of vertical 
FDI, where relative labor-endowment differences are the sources of FDI. Earlier studies have 
found weak or mixed evidence on the KC-model, mostly stemming from the weak support for the 
vertical part of the model. Thus, they find little support for the notion that FDI may take place in 
order to benefit from factor endowment differences across countries. In contrast to previous 
empirical studies, we find firm and robust evidence in favor of the KC-model and its vertical 
component. 
 
We argue that our robust results follow from two crucial shortcomings in the previous empirical 
analysis. As the KC-model predicts that vertical FDI should primarily flow from small skilled-
labor abundant countries to large unskilled-abundant ones, we obviously need to include data 
points of such combinations of home- and host countries, which was usually not done in previous 
studies. In this paper, we use an extensive dataset on affiliate sales, covering 56 home countries 
and 85 host countries, which means that we cover a far larger share of the endowment space than 
previous studies. In particular, we also have a better coverage of factor endowment combinations 
where vertical FDI should occur. 
 
Apart from data coverage, we geometrically derive our empirical specification within the so-
called Edgeworth endowment box diagram, whereas the empirical set-up in previous studies has 
been based on an indirect mapping from theory to estimation. This difference proves to be crucial 
in the area of the factor box, where the KC-model typically fails in empirical studies, i.e. when 
the home country is skilled-labor abundant and considerable vertical FDI is predicted. Thus, we 
conclude that previous empirical studies have found weak evidence for the KC-model due to the 
fact that the data coverage has been poor and the mapping from theory to empirics indirect. Our   3
empirical results are also easy to visualize, and these plots do not only show a remarkable 
resemblance to the theoretical predictions but also give further insights into why previous studies 
yielded such diverse results. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review theory and evidence; section 3 
describes the estimation equation and the data, while section 4 presents the estimation results. 
Section 5 reconciles our results with earlier literature. Section 6  concludes.  
 
2.  Theory and Evidence on the KC-model  
MNEs are often classified to be of the horizontal or vertical type, according to their type of 
affiliate operations. In general, horizontal MNEs conduct FDI in order to improve the access to 
host country markets, while vertical FDI is undertaken to reap benefits from international factor 
price differences. In the Knowledge Capital Model (KC-model), developed in Markusen (1997) 
and Markusen (2002), FDI is driven by both factor costs and market access and, thus, it 
incorporates both vertical and horizontal FDI.  In this section, we will briefly outline the model 
and refer to Markusen (2002) for a detailed description. 
 
In the KC-model, there are two countries, home (i) and foreign (j); two factors of production, 
skilled (S) and unskilled (U) labor; and two goods, X and Y. Y-production is perfectly 
competitive and subject to constant returns to scale. FDI can only occur in the X-sector. Good X 
is produced with increasing returns to scale, using a three-stage production process. In the first 
stage, a firm must undertake some headquarter services such as R&D, management, accounting 
or marketing activities, which generate firm-level fixed costs.  In the second stage, plant-level 
fixed costs are incurred. In the final stage, production takes place and X-firms compete in a 
Cournot fashion. Markets are assumed to be segmented and trade costs exist when shipping X-
goods across borders.   4
Assuming a ranking where headquarter activities are more skilled-labor intensive relative to 
(integrated plant and final) production of X which, in turn, is more skill-intensive than Y-
production, three firm types can emerge:  
 
•  Horizontal MNEs have their headquarter activities tied to the home plant and duplicate 
the domestic production plant in the host country.
 MNEs of the horizontal type sell their 
entire production locally.  
•  Vertical MNEs slice up the value chain by locating high-skilled labor intensive 
headquarter services in the high-skilled labor abundant home country, and relatively low-
skilled labor intensive production activity in the low-skilled labor abundant host country. 
MNEs of the vertical type export (part of) their production to the home country.  
•  National firms solely produce in the home country and serve foreign markets by exports.  
 
Figure 1 shows simulated levels of affiliate sales of country i firms in country j, taken from 
Markusen (2002).
3 Country endowments of skilled and unskilled labor are measured on the 
vertical and the horizontal axis, respectively, where si is the home country’s share of the world 
endowment of skilled labor, whereas ui is its share of the world endowment of unskilled labor. 
The origin of the home country is in the S-W corner, while the origin of the potential host country 
is in the N-E corner of the diagram. Above the diagonal, the home country is skill abundant 
relative to the host country. Finally, the relative economic size of the home country grows along 
the diagonal from S-W to N-E. 
 
Vertical MNEs appear N-W of the diagonal line, where relative endowments are very different. 
Differences in factor prices induce a fragmentation of activities, with headquarters locating in the 
skilled-labor abundant country and production in the unskilled-labor abundant country. However, 
the incentive for such vertical fragmentation is strongest when the home country is 
                                                 
3 We thank James Markusen for providing us with simulation results.   5
simultaneously skilled-labor abundant and small (generating the peak in affiliate sales around 
point V in Figure 1).  In a large home country, firms have weaker incentives to serve the home 
market from a branch-plant in the host country due to trade costs.  
                                        
Horizontal MNEs are concentrated close to the center of the Edgeworth box (generating peaking 
affiliate sales at point H), where relative endowments and relative country size are rather similar.  
Intuitively, dissimilar size penalizes horizontal MNEs as the smaller market still requires fixed 
investment costs. In that case, national firms in the larger market are predominant. Horizontal 
MNEs  emerge when the home country is slightly more high-skilled labor abundant, because the 
X-sector itself is high-skilled labor intensive, relative to the Y-sector. However, when countries 
become too dissimilar in endowments, diverging factor prices can be exploited by fragmentation.   
     
The empirical evidence on the KC-model is mixed. Table 1 gives an overview of previous 
empirical results. Pooling US inward and outward FDI data, Carr et al. (2001), henceforth CMM, 
provide strong support for the KC model, finding that affiliate sales (i) increase in the total 
income of the host and home countries, (ii) increase in skill differences, while (iii) dissimilarities 
in size reduce affiliate sales. In addition, they find that (iv) home countries which are 
simultaneously skilled-labor abundant and small, have higher affiliate sales. These findings are 
broadly consistent with the pattern of FDI in Figure 1. 
 
However, Markusen and Maskus (2001) find a negative relation between affiliate sales and 
skilled labor abundance in the home country when investigating outward US FDI only. Moreover, 
Markusen and Maskus (2002a) formally reject the KC-model in favor of a Horizontal model, 
where vertical FDI is ruled out by assumption. Blonigen, Davies and Head (2002), henceforth 
BDH, find further evidence for the Horizontal model. Regressing affiliate sales from the CMM 
sample, as well as FDI stocks, on absolute values of differences in skill endowments and size, 
they find that such differences – whether positive or negative – decrease affiliate sales.    6
Recently, a few papers have also provided some evidence in favor of vertical FDI in the KC-
model, however. Davies (2002) argues that the estimation equation of CMM must be amended by 
including additional terms in CMM’s original specification.  Based on Figure 1, he argues for a 
third-order polynomial in skill differences to detect the maximum point (where horizontal FDI 
peaks) and the inflection point (where horizontal MNEs are being replaced by vertical MNEs). 
However, favorable evidence for an inflection point is only found when using FDI stocks 
proxying for FDI and total years of schooling proxying for skills, rather than the ILO data on 
skills and data on affiliate sales used by CMM.   
 
Braconier, Urban and Norbäck (2002) investigate the link between wage costs and FDI using 
outward FDI data for Sweden and the US. An advantage of their paper is that pooling these data 
greatly enhances the coverage of bilateral country pairs in the endowment box. They find strong 
evidence of the KC-model, confirming the results in CMM (2001). However, their skill-measure 
is derived from wage data (using the home to host difference in relative wages between skilled 
and unskilled labor),  rather than from the actual endowments of  skilled and unskilled labor, from  
which  the  KC model is defined.
 4 
 
Summing up the literature has produced surprisingly mixed results. In the following sections, we 
investigate the sources of this heterogeneity of the evidence on the KC-model.  
 
3. Contributions 
This paper makes three specific contributions. First, our empirical specification follows directly 
from theory, especially in the case of relative skill endowments. Second, we also use a new data 
set on affiliate sales, which has a superior coverage of home and host countries as compared to 
previous studies. Finally, our results can be directly compared to the theoretical predictions of the 
KC-model illustrated in Figure 1.    7
3.1 Re-defining the Estimation Equation 
There are several possible mappings of the KC-model to data.
5 Previous empirical specifications 
in general, and the CMM specification in particular, only constitute an indirect mapping of the 
theoretical predictions of Figure 1, as can be seen in Table 2. Note that the main independent 
variables of the KC-model are the home country share in world endowments of high-skilled and 
low-skilled labor, si and ui. Instead, using ILO data skilled labor, the corresponding variables used 
in the CMM empirical specification are home and host country GDP and the home and host 
country difference in the share of skilled labor in the total population of the respective home and 
host countries, SKILLDIF.  Furthermore, CMM capture movements along the SW-NE diagonal of 
Figure 1 only through the squared-difference of GDP between the home and the host country, 
GDPDIFSQ. This implies that a U-shape or an inverse U-shape is imposed on the data. 
 
We propose an alternative functional form that can be directly mapped from theory. This 
specification is also defined in Table 2, where a comparison to CMM is also made. Note that 
coordinates in the Edgeworth box of Figure 1 give the position of bilateral pairs of countries. 
Hence, the law of Pythagoras implies that the size of a country can be calculated by the length of 
a ray from the origin to its endowment point in the Edgeworth box, i.e  2 2
i i i s u SIZE + = . To 
account for the fact that size may have a nonlinear effect on MNE activities and affiliate sales, we 
also include its square, SIZESQi. Together, these two variables will capture how movements 
along rays from the home country origin affect the level of MNE activities, measured as affiliate 
sales. Skill abundance is then measured directly as the slope of a ray, from the origin to a point in 





SKILL = .  Note that the variables SIZEi  and  SKILLi   completely define the home 
country’s position in the Edgeworth box. 
                                                                                                                                                      
4 Other studies on vertical FDI that do not involve structural estimation of the KC-model, are Hummels, 
Rapoport and Yi (1998), Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001).   
5 A similar evaluation stems from Markusen and Maskus (2002b): “… the knowledge-capital model, a hybrid 
of a vertical and a horizontal model, is a conceptually difficult one for estimation. Relationships predicted by 
the model are not only non-linear but non-monotonic. The implication of this is that there is room for 
reasonable disagreement as to what the appropriate estimation equation should be.” (p. 1)    8
In line with theory, we also employ the same non-linear interaction term as CMM and define 
INTERi as the product of SIZEi  and SKILLi. We also control for the actual size of the Edgeworth 
box in the same way as CMM, by including the total income of the two countries, SUMGDP. 
This gravity effect should have a positive impact on affiliate sales. The additional control 
variables are the same as those used by CMM. Consequently, we propose the following 
estimation equation: 
  
( ) 12 3 4 5 6
78 91 0 1 1
1 ii i i
ij j j
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where RSALES is the real total sales of country i’s affiliates in country j. Regarding the additional 
control variables of CMM, PROTj denotes an index of trade barriers to country j. Increasing 
protection should increase the tariff-jumping incentive for horizontal FDI in host country j and, 
hence, increase affiliate sales. PROTi denotes the same index of trade barriers but applied to 
country i.  Increasing protection in the home country makes re-exporting to the home country 
more costly and should therefore reduce affiliate sales. INVCj denotes an index of the costs of 
investing in country j. Increasing investment protection should therefore reduce affiliate sales.  
The three latter variables are collected by World Economic Forum and are further described in 
the data appendix. INTERPROTj is an interaction variable between the level of protection in 
country j, PROTj, and the square of the skill-difference, SKILLDIF. CMM are agnostic about the 
sign of this variable, but weakly suggest a negative impact. 
6  Finally, we also include 
geographical distance, DIST, between the home and the host country capitals. Definitions of 
independent variables, their expected influence on affiliate sales and a comparison to CMM are 
given in Table 2. 
 
                                                 
6 Host country trade costs affect only horizontal MNEs. Moreover, horizontal MNEs appear when countries 
are similar in endowments.  CMM therefore suggest that INTERPROTj has a  negative impact. However,  
simulations  show a much more complicated interaction, and CMM conclude that this is not a “theoretically 
sharp hypothesis”.   9
3.2 Collecting new Data 
The second improvement on the previous literature is to increase the coverage of FDI data. We 
have collected data from the OECD Globalization Database and supplement these with national 
data on inward and outward FDI from the US, Germany and Italy, combined with outward FDI 
data from Sweden and Japan.
7 To keep the database homogeneous, we selected data for the years 
1986, 1990, 1994 and 1998. We have bilateral affiliate sales data for 56 home countries and 85 
host countries with at least one observation. The coverage of country pairs increases about six 
times as compared to US inward and outward FDI data alone. As we have taken data from 
different sources, there are differences in definitions of FDI, coverage, and data quality across 
observations. The OECD Globalization Database and some national sources sometimes also 
report zero values of affiliate sales. Those have been kept. For other sources, missing values may 
either be unknown or undisclosed and hence, we cannot set the affiliate sales of country pairs 
missing in the official statistics to zero, even though it may be appropriate in many cases. 
Affiliate sales data are in constant 1990 billion US Dollar. Summary statistics can be found in 
Table A1. 
 
To see the improvements in the coverage of our affiliate sales data, Figure 2 shows the coverage 
of the commonly used US inward and outward data on affiliate sales
8 in an Edgeworth box 
diagram similar to Figure 1. Using the previously mentioned ILO data on skilled labor, we depict 
the home country skilled-labor share of the combined home and host country skilled-labor 
endowment on the vertical axis, si, and the home country unskilled-labor share of the combined 
home and host country unskilled labor endowment on the horizontal axis, ui. 
 
We see that US outward FDI observations are only found in the upper right-hand corner and US 
inward FDI observations in the lower left-hand corner. This distribution reflects the fact that the 
                                                 
7 A precise data description is found in the Appendix 
8 See Carr et al. (2001) and Markusen and Maskus (1999, 2001).   10
US economy is the largest in this dataset. Then, we make a comparison with  our new dataset and 
in Figure 3, we see that the coverage of the Edgeworth box has increased substantially. 
 
For comparison, we follow Blonigen et al. (2001) and Davis (2002) and also collect FDI stock 
data under the assumption that total bilateral FDI stocks are closely correlated with affiliate sales. 
These data are obtained from OECD and cover 57 host countries and 58 home countries. The 
coverage of host countries is hence lower in the stock data. Moreover, the correlation between 
FDI stocks and affiliate sales is 0.79. Thus, the results based on FDI stocks must be interpreted 
with care. 461 observations of FDI stocks are available from two data sources – the inward FDI 
data source of the host country and the outward FDI data source of the home country, and the 




First, we present our baseline specification and then we undertake a number of robustness checks. 
 
4.1 Re-estimating the KC-model 
In column (i) of Table 3, we present the estimates for our specification in (1), using affiliate sales 
as the dependent variable. The coefficients for the variables of interests are significant at the one 
per cent level with the expected signs. In particular, there are more affiliate sales if the home and 
the host country have a similar relative size (coefficient on SIZEi positive and on SIZESQi 
negative) and affiliate sales increase in the high-skilled labor abundancy of the home country, 
relative to the host country (coefficient on SKILLi positive). Our results are in line with the 
prediction of the KC-model that small and high-skilled labor abundant home countries have 
proportionately most affiliate sales in host countries (negative coefficient on INTERi). 
Turning to the control variables, the overall size of the home and the host country (SUMGDP), 
investment costs and home country protection have the expected signs, albeit home country 
                                                 
9 There are similar problems with affiliate sales data. This is described further in the Appendix.   11
protection is not significant. Distance is  highly significant, but not the interaction term of squared 
relative skill endowment and protection of the host country (INTERPROTj). Only in the case of 
host country protection do the results contradict the KC-model.
 10  In column (ii), we add home 
and host country fixed effects and the results in favor of the KC-model are even stronger. While 
all terms with variables of interest remain highly significant with the expected signs, the host 
protection now also becomes significant with correct sign. 
 
Blonigen et al. (2002) dispute the results in CMM (2001), because a structural break occurs when 
the sample is split into home country skilled-labor abundant and unskilled-labor abundant 
observations. We find no such breaks in our estimations, as follows from columns (iii) and (iv). 
The results from the FDI stock data are also encouraging. In both specifications without home 
and host country fixed effects (v) and with home and host country fixed effects (vi), we find all 
terms with variables of interest (SKILLi and SIZEi) to be significant at the one per cent level with 
the expected sign.  
 
4.2 Robustness  
To test the robustness of our specification, we first include additional control variables in the 
specification in (1), and later also apply alternative econometric techniques. Column (i) in Table 4 
replicates column (ii) in Table 3 with an additional neighbor dummy, indicating whether 
countries i and j have a common border (ADJACENT). 
 
 From column (i), we see that no qualitative changes in estimates occur, while the border dummy 
variable is highly significant. Column (ii) shows results for a tobit regression, as we have roughly 
200 observations with a zero value of affiliate sales. Once more, no qualitative change of 
coefficients occurs.   
  
                                                 
10 Similar problems are encountered in Carr et al. (2001). Braconier, Norbäck and Urban (2002) point out a   12
A potential problem is heteroscedasticity, which remains even though we control for the total size 
of the home and host country and use the White correction. In column (iii), we therefore apply a 
WLS regression, where we use the product of home and host country GDP as the weight. As 
expected, this WLS estimation leads to a substantial increase in R
2. However, there is no 
substantial change in estimated coefficients compared to the baseline specification. We also 
observe similar results when using the sum of home and host country GDP as weights (column 
iv).  
 
4.3 Discriminating between alternative models  
A significant advantage of our approach is that we can reproduce a direct graphical image of our 
estimates of  (1) in an Edgeworth-box diagram. This is shown in Figure 4, which depicts the 
implied surface from column (ii) in Table 3. There is a striking similarity between the theory in 
terms of the surface in Figure 1 and the estimated surface in Figure 4, which exhibits an inverse 
U-shape in affiliate sales along the diagonal connecting the country origins, stemming from 
extensive horizontal FDI, when countries are similar in size. Moreover, the maximum affiliate 
sales are predicted when the home country is small and skilled-labor abundant at the same time, 
which corresponds to large amounts of vertical FDI.  Hence, our specification (1) gives strong 
evidence for the KC-model. 
 
The estimated surface in Figure 4 also provides an alternative way of gauging the KC-model 
against competing models. Markusen and Maskus (2002a) nest a Horizontal model (which, by 
assumption, rules out vertical MNEs) and a Vertical model (which, by assumption, rules out 
horizontal MNEs) within an unrestricted KC model. Figures 5 and 6 show the surfaces implied by 
the Horizontal and the Vertical model, respectively.  First, note that our estimated surface (Figure 
4), revealing a maximum of affiliate sales at point V, is clearly not consistent with the Horizontal 
model (Figure 5). While the KC-model and the Horizontal model give rise to quite distinct 
                                                                                                                                                      
multicolliniarity  problem between the trade- and investment costs measures.   13
surfaces, the surface of the Vertical model is more similar to that of the KC model.  However, a 
major difference is that the inverse U-shape along SW-NE diagonals in the KC-model (Figure 1) 
is almost absent in the Vertical model (Figure 6). Hence, identifying the local maximum point H 
in the middle of our estimated surface (Figure 4) is not consistent with the Vertical model. In 
contrast, the simultaneous concentration of sales at points H and V in our estimated surface is 
only consistent with the KC- model. 
 
This visual inspection is also suggestive of more formal testing. The Horizontal model (Figure 5) 
shows that affiliate sales should follow an inverse U-shape both when the home country increases 
in size and in skill abundance.  To allow for the latter, the square of the variable SKILLi, labeled 
SKILLSQi is added to (1). Both the KC-model and the Horizontal model should produce a positive 
sign on  SIZEi and a negative sign on SIZESQi.  However, as noted above, these effects should be 
small in the Vertical model (Figure 6).  All three models predict a positive sign on SKILLi, whereas 
the effect on SKILLSQi should be negative in the Horizontal model while this effect is less clear-cut 
in the Vertical and the KC-model. This will be discussed in more detail in section 5.2. 
 
A negative coefficient on INTERi  implies that affiliate sales are larger for small and skilled-labor 
abundant countries.  Comparing Figures 1, 5 and 6, a negative coefficient on INTERi would 
therefore reject the Horizontal model in favor of the KC-model and the Vertical model.  According 
to Markusen and Maskus (2002a), affiliate sales in the Vertical FDI model depend positively on the 
interaction of skill difference and the sum of home and host country GDP (defined as 
INTSUM=SKILLSQi*SUMGDP) in contrast to the Horizontal FDI and the KC-models. They also 
argue that the effect of SUMGDP is (close to) zero in the Vertical model, while this gravity effect 
should increase affiliate sales both in the Vertical and the Horizontal model. Finally, we add as 
controls the remaining variables in (1), including the neighbor variable. To facilitate a comparison 
with previous papers (summarized in Table 1), we use the OLS-specification without fixed effects. 
   14
The results in Table 5 show that we can reject the Horizontal and the Vertical models in favor of the 
KC-model, as the coefficients on the size variables are inconsistent with the vertical FDI model 
while INTERi is inconsistent with the Horizontal model. Hence, only the KC-model is consistent 
with all coefficients of variable interest.
11 Thus, we can also formally reject the Horizontal and 
Vertical models in favor of the KC model. 
 
5.  Reconciling the evidence 
So far, we have found strong support for the KC model, which stands in sharp contrast to the earlier 
mixed results in the literature. However, in this final section, we argue that given our estimation 
approach, there is a surprising consistency with the previous literature to be recovered. 
 
5.1   The role of sample coverage 
In section 2, we noted the results in CMM (2001) being supportive of the KC-model whereas a 
number of papers, such as Markusen and Maskus (2001) and Blonigen, Davies and Head (2002), 
questioned these results. The latter papers uncover that US outward FDI is skilled-labor seeking, 
whereas the opposite holds for US inward FDI. BDH (2002) argue this evidence to be in favor of 
the Horizontal model, rejecting the KC-model. However, looking at the estimated surface in Figure 
4, these results are consistent with the KC-model. As revealed by Figure 2, the US is so large that 
observations on US inward FDI are located far down to the S-E (below the 45 degree line), whereas 
US outward FDI is located far up to the N-W (above the 45 degree line). Comparing with the 
estimated curvature in Figure 4, US outward FDI may well decrease when the US becomes more 
skill abundant, whereas the opposite holds for inward FDI.  In fact, it seems that it is precisely by 
pooling these “local” curvatures that CMM (2001) are able to find support for the KC-model, 
despite the poor coverage of the US data in the center of the Edgeworth box.  
 
                                                 
11 F-tests on the joint restrictions are available upon request.   15
Figures 1 and 2 also illustrate why formal tests attempting to discriminate between the KC-model 
and the Horizontal model, using the US data, have little power: there are virtually no observations 
capturing the vertical part of the KC-model in the US data.
12 BDH (2002) attempt to circumvent 
this by using FDI stocks, which  extensively increase the coverage as compared to the US sales 
data. Using FDI stocks, they cannot reject the Horizontal model in favor of the KC-model. 
However, stock data is a rather imperfect proxy for affiliate sales. We therefore re-estimated CMM 
(2001) on our extended data set on affiliate sales. For comparison, we also included estimates on 
FDI stock data from the OECD.  The results are shown in Table 6.  
 
In specifications (i) and (ii), we re-estimate the CMM-functional form without and with fixed 
effects (applied to home- and host country). Following BDH, we split the sample according to skill-
abundance in specifications (iii) and (iv), while FDI stock data are examined in specifications (v) 
and (vi). Even when using our affiliate sales data, which have an extensive coverage, compared to 
the US data, there is no consistent evidence on the KC-model. Only in specification (v), applying 
OLS to FDI stocks, do we find that the more high-skilled labor abundant is the home country 
relative to the host country, the larger are affiliate sales. In all other specifications, the skill variable 
SKILLDIF is not significant and often appears with the incorrect sign. 
 
5.2   The role of the empirical specification 
Given the weak support we find for the CMM specification, it is puzzling that our specification (1) 
provides such strong support for the KC-model (in terms of estimated coefficients, formal testing or 
graphics, applying both affiliate sales and FDI stock data). However, in section 3.1, we noted that 
the CMM specification is an indirect mapping from theory, while we measure the skill-abundance 
directly from the Edgeworth-box. This implies that the CMM skill-measure will not consistently 
measure the “true” skill abundance of the home country.
13 This “distortion” becomes large when 
                                                 
12 This is also suggested by Markusen and Maskus (2002b).  
13 This problem is magnified by the fact that there is no direct size measure of the home country (only 
differences in size appear in regressions), which means that the CMM specification provides a distorted measure 
for the home country’s position in the Edgeworth box.   16
the home country is skilled-labor abundant, as can be illustrated in Figure 7 where we plot the 
difference between our skill measure and CMM’s,  SKILLi –SKILLDIF, for observations where the 
home country is skilled labor abundant.
14 Note that this difference is equal to unity at the 45  degree 
line, but increasing and reaching a maximum in the area where vertical FDI is predicted by the KC-
model. Indeed, it is the variation in skill abundance in these observations which is instrumental for 
identifying the vertical part of the KC model and, hence, for rejecting the Horizontal model in favor 
of the KC model 
 
From the estimated surface in Figure 6, our data also suggest that there is a single, smoothly shaped 
peak in affiliate sales when the home country is small and skilled-labor abundant. Indeed, it is 
through this finding that we identify vertical FDI. However, as noted in section 2, Davies (2002) 
argues for an alternative test for the vertical part in the KC-model by searching for an inflection 
point where skill abundance increases when moving from S-E to N-W in Figure 1. Following 
Davies, we therefore estimated a specification of (1) using a polynomial of degree three in the skill 
variable, SKILLi.  
 
Similar to his results on the ILO data (see Table 1), we find no evidence of an inflection point, and 
the estimated surface in Figure 8 is almost indistinguishable from that in Figure 4.
15  However, this 
does not constitute evidence against the KC model; comparing our data in Figure 3 with the 
estimated surface in Figure 4, reveals that there are virtually no observations in the N-W region 
where inflection points should appear. Hence, our predicted surface in this area mirrors an out of 
                                                 






















































where S  and U are the total world endowment of skilled and unskilled labor. Note  that  ∞ = ∆ ) U , S , , ( 0 1 , 
1 1 0 = ∆ ) U , S , , (  and  1 = ∆ ) U , S , u , s ( i i  for si = ui  and S = U. 
15 The estimates are available on request.   17
sample prediction.
16  In contrast, our estimated surface is generated from the area where there are 
observations: In this wide region in Figure 3, the KC-model is unambiguously identified through 
the inverse U-shape along the S-W to N-E diagonal, and the peak of affiliate sales when the home 
country is small and unskilled labor abundant. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this study, we estimate the Knowledge Capital Model described in Markusen (2002). We make 
three specific improvements on previous attempts to estimate this model. First, we geometrically 
derive measures of relative size and relative skill-endowments from the Edgeworth-box, which 
proves to be crucial for our results. Second, our estimation equation allows us to graphically 
compare our results to theoretical predictions based on simulations. Finally, we make a major effort 
in compiling data on affiliate sales for a large number of countries with diverse endowments. 
Hence, we have a far larger coverage of the factor-endowment box as compared to previous studies. 
 
Previous studies have found mixed evidence on the KC-model, especially on its vertical FDI part. 
This follows partly from the fact that they use a much more limited set of data, which does not 
provide observations where vertical FDI is most likely to occur, i.e. when the home country is small 
and skill-abundant. Another reason why previous studies only provide weak empirical evidence on 
the KC-model is that the common approach, based on CMM, provides a measure of skill which 
becomes increasingly biased as the home country’s skill-intensity increases. 
   
In contrast, our empirical results give strong support for the KC-model, when we use our suggested 
empirical specification. The graphical image of our empirical results shows a remarkable similarity 
to simulations of the KC-model. The results are also very robust to changes in the specification. 
Consequently, we conclude that the KC-model seems to fit the data surprisingly well. 
 
                                                 
16 Likewise, the estimated surface also shows positive sales in the region where the home country is highly 
unskilled-labor abundant.   18
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We use the following outward FDI datasets: 
Italian Outward FDI: turnover from REPRINT database, Polytecnico Milano 
Swedish Outward FDI: total affiliate sales from IUI; 
Japanese Outward FDI: total affiliate sales from Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Wagakuni Kigyo no Kaigai 
Jigyo Katsudo, various issues. Without financial firms. The year 1988 of sales data are matched with control variables 
from 1986. 
German Outward FDI, total affiliate sales from Deutsche Bundesbank, Kapitalverflechtungen mit dem Ausland, various 
issues. Without financial firms. Reporting of MNEs is voluntary.  
For US outward FDI, total affiliate sales from BEA. The years 1986, 1990, 1994 are obtained from Carr, Markusen and 




We also use the following Inward FDI datasets from OECD, Globalisation Database, CD-ROM, which, in turn, rely on 
national sources described there. Data were updated from the new hard-cover version OECD (2001) Measuring 
Globalisation – The role of multinationals in OECD economies – Volume I: Manufacturing Sector. 
 
For UK inward FDI gross output is taken; the year 1989 is matched with control variables for 1990, the year 1996 is 
matched with control variables for 1998. There are no data for the year 1986. 
For Turkish inward FDI the gross output is taken. The year 1991 is matched with control variables for 1990, the year 
1996 with control variables for the year 1998. There are no data for 1986. Data are supplemented from OECD (2001) for 
1998. (Production value) 
For Irish inward FDI gross output is taken. The control variables for 1998 are matched with affiliate data from 1996. 
Canadian Inward FDI: for the year 1986 turnover, for other observations gross output. Affiliate data from 1996 are 
matched with control variables of the year 1998. 
French inward FDI: data from January 1, 1989 are matched with control variables for the year 1986. Data for January 1, 
1999 are obtained from Feuvrier and Lehoucq (2000). L’implantation étrangère dans l’industrie française, SESSI.  Data 
on affiliate turnover are used. Data from 1994 and 1998 are from OECD (2001). Turnover data of manufacturing sector 
are reported. 
Mexican inward FDI: Turnover, data for the year 1985 are matched with control variables for 1986, data from 1993  are 
matched with the control variable year 1994, there are no data for 1998. 
Inward FDI of Finland: the turnover of foreign affiliates in the year 1995 is matched with control variables for the year 
1994, data of 1997 with 1998. The year 1998 is taken from OECD (2001). 
Swedish inward FDI: Turnover of the year 1996 is matched with control variables for the year 1998. No data are available 
for 1986. New data on  turnover for 1998 from OECD (2001). 
Norwegian inward FDI: Gross output of the year 1991 is matched with control variables for 1990 and 1996 is matched with 
1998. No data are available for 1986. New data on affiliate production for 1998 from OECD (2001). 
Dutch inward FDI: Affiliate turnover data of 1995 are matched with data from 1994, affiliate data from 1996 are matched 
with 1998. No other years are available. Data for 1995 and 1998 are taken from OECD (2001). 
Polish Inward FDI: from OECD (2001), turnover of foreign affiliates, The affiliate data for the year 1997 are matched 
with control variables for 1994 and affiliate data for 1999 with control variables for 1998.  
Japanese inward FDI: Turnover of foreign affiliates, data for the year 1996 are matched with control variables for 1998. 
the year 1986 is not available. 
German Inward FDI: Sales data based on voluntary reporting, and comprising all sectors are taken from Bundesbank, 
Kapitalverflechtungen mit dem Ausland, various issues. Double counting if a company has owners from several foreign 
countries; Dependent holding companies are excluded. For further information, see Bundesbank (2001) Kapital-
verflechtungen mit dem Ausland, Sonderveröffentlichungen. The year 1986 is missing. 
US inward FDI: from OECD (1999). The year 1998 is taken from OECD (2001). Turnover data. 
Italian Inward FDI: from Reprint database of Politecnico di Milano, various years. (Cominotti, R., S. Mariotti, M. 
Mutinelli, Italia Multinazionale 1998, CNEL, Roma 1999; Cominotti, R., S. Mariotti, Italia Multinazionale 1994, CNEL, 
1994; Cominotti, R., S. Mariotti, Italia Multinazionale 1992, CNEL, 1992; Onida, F., and G. Viesti (eds.), The Italian 
Multinationals, Croom Helm, New York, 1988). The year 1987 is used instead of 1986, 1993 instead of 1994, 1997 
instead of 1998. Data refer to sales. Remark: this is the extended version covering more countries of the data reported in 
OECD (1999, 2001). 
 
All sales/production/turnover data are in Mill. USD, using exchange rates from OECD Economic Outlook (for Italy and 
Turkey WDI=period averages) and deflated by the US wholesale price index (from OECD, Economic Outlook).   20
Whenever in- and outward data supplied the same home-host country-pairing, the outward FDI data were considered to be 
more reliable. There are 129 observations from double sources, correlation 0.89.  
 
FDI Stock data: 
 
FDI Stock data are taken from the OECD Compendium. Instead of the year 1998, the year 1997 is taken. There are still 
plenty of missing values for 1997. The data are separate from inward FDI sources and outward FDI sources and an FDI 
stock of a host country in a home country usually differs depending on the source – host-country inward FDI or home-
country outward FDI data. Some values are negative. The coverage is limited to OECD-home countries in the outward 
FDI database and to OECD host countries in the inward FDI database. The merger of the two databases also yields a 
fairly broad coverage of non-OECD countries. All values are in Mill USD, using average annual exchange rates and a US 
deflator with the base year 1990. We find a correlation of 0.91 for the 448 observations for which we have information 
both from inward FDI and outward FDI data-sources. This indicates a substantial measurement error of FDI stock data, 
which may be due to different balance sheet and current account rules across countries or exchange rate effects. We 
calculate our FDI stock variable as a simple average of the two data-sources. There are 58 home countries and 57 host-
countries in the dataset, respectively. 
 




Share of skilled labor: obtained from ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, various years (data for US FDI obtained from 
Markusen and Maskus, 2001). Ratio of workers of occupational category 0/1 and 2 according to ISCO68, relative to the 
total number of workers. If there is a switch in the reporting of a country from ISCO68 to ISCO88, then an adjustment is 
made for all observations reporting according to ISCO88. The growth rate of the employment share of occupational 
categories 1,2 and 3 according to ISCO88 is calculated over the year, when the break in reporting occurs, to the year 
considered. Then, the last year before the break of reporting is multiplied by one plus this growth rate to yield the adjusted 
ISCO68 estimated for the year considered. If observations are only available according to ISCO88, then these 
observations are multiplied by the factor 0.69. This factor is obtained from observations on those countries, for which a 
change in reporting occurred, by calculating the average ratio of skilled labor according to ISCO68 and ISCO88 
observations for the consecutive years when the break in reporting occurs. Occasionally, another year close by was 
chosen if there would otherwise be missing observations. Sweden does not report category 2, ISCO68, separately from 
category 3 in the year 1994; Hence, category 3 is included in 1994; Another structural break occurs in 1998, when 
Statistic Sweden switches its reporting to ISCO88; 
 
Investment cost: Data source is World Economic Forum and data were partially obtained from Carr et al. (2001) and 
missing data were supplemented by own construction from the original source wherever available. Survey data with index 
range 0-100 (0=low cost). Composed of the unweighted average of answer scale to 10 questions that are related to 
obstacles to conducting FDI in a country. See Carr et al. (2001) for more information. 
 
Protection: Obtained from World Economic Forum. Composed of the unweighted average of answer scale to 2 questions 
related to trade protection. See Carr et al. (2001) for more information. 
 
 
Neighbor: Dummy variable with value 1 if a home country is the neighbor of a host country. 
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 Table 2 : Defining the CMM-specification  and the BNU-specification (1) of the KC model. 
 
       
     Carr, Markusen and Maskus (CMM): 
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Si ( Sj ) is the endowment of 
country i (j)  of skilled labor. 
 
Ui ( Uj ) is the endowment of 
country i (j)  of unskilled labor. 
 
     
Li ( Lj ) is the total population   of 
country i (j).   
 
Si ( Sj ) is the endowment of 
country i (j)  of skilled labor.  
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Table 3: Estimating the BNU-specification  (1) 
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507     
1796 
 
1796   
Adj  R2 0.30 0.36 0.51 0,47   0.26 0.36  
Note: t-values in parenthesis, *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
Time-specific effects always included.  FE-specifications include home- and host country fixed effects. 
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Table 4: Extensions of the BNU-specification  (1) 
 





























































































































































































































































































1122   
Adj R2  0.38   0.79 0.42   
LR chi2    821.20       
Note: t-values in parenthesis, *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
Time-specific effects always included.  FE-specifications include home- and host country fixed effects.   26
Table 5: Testing the KC-model against the Horizontal- and the Vertical model 
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(-3.99)          -         -         - 
















(-1.44)          -         -        - 






(4.97)           ?         ?        ? 












          ?          ?        ? 

















1122        
Adj  R2  0.32 0.35 0.35         
Note: t-values in parenthesis, *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level 
Time-specific effects included.  KC denotes the KC-model, VER denotes the Vertical model and  HOR denotes  the 
Horizontal model. 
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Table 6: Re-estimating the CMM (2001) 
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1796   
Adj  R2  0.41 0.56 0.51 0.75    0.31  0.52  
Note: t-values in parenthesis, *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 








 Figure 1: Simulated affiliate sales based on the KC model
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Figure 3: Illustrating the coverage of  the extended sample on 
affiliates sales Home country 
























Figure 4: Illustrating  predicted affiliate sales from (1)
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Figure 5: Simulated affiliate sales based on the Horizontal 
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Figure 6: Simulated affiliate sales based on the Vertical 






























Figure 7: Illustrating the difference SKILLi –SKILLDIF, when  the 
home country is skilled labor abundant.Home country 






















Figure 8: Illustrating  predicted affiliate sales when using a 
polynom of degree three in SKILLi  in (1). 
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